Background
One of the most intriguing questions about the use of reference in language has to do with the multiplicity of possible forms that can be used to successfully identify a referent in a given situation. For example, a certain dog can be referred to by the definite descriptions "the dog" or "the animal", by the proper name "Fido", or by the pronoun "he". Clearly, referential forms are not used randomly, and furthermore, their distribution exhibits some consistent patterns within languages and also across languages (Ariel, 1990; Givon, 1976) . The question is then, what constraints underlie the distribution of referential forms and more specifically, what psychological mechanisms are involved in the production and resolution of referential expressions? The study of this question spans across several disciplines which emphasize different aspects of the relevant issues.
Research in cognitive psychology on conceptual representation and categorization focuses on the question of what makes a certain expression more likely to be used for naming a certain object or event in the world (e.g., Rips, 1989; Rosch, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) . The emphasis in this research is on how people's mental representation of world knowledge underlies naming and categorization. In contrast, much research in linguistics and psycholinguistics focuses on the study of anaphoric 1 expressions that are linked to referents by being co-referential with another linguistic expression, the antecedent. As in the case of referring expressions in general, there is more than one anaphoric form that can be used to successfully identify the antecedent. A central question for linguists and psycholinguists is, what factors affect the choice of a particular form in any given circumstance? In certain cases of anaphors that appear within the same clause as their antecedent, there seem to be strong syntactic constraints on the range of possible anaphoric forms (Chomsky, 1981) . These syntactic constraints apply on the basis of the relative positions of the antecedent and anaphor in the structural representation of the embedding clause (Chomsky, 1981 ; although see Gordon & Hendrick, in press , for behavioral evidence questioning the grammaticality intuitions underlying some of these structural principles). However, in most cases, anaphors appear in the same discourse as their antecedent but not within the local domain in which syntactic rules apply. These "discourse anaphors" are not bound by syntactic rules that render some forms grammatical and others not, but instead seem to be bound with a set of constraints that make certain forms "better" than others in a given situation (Ariel, 1990; Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993) . Thus, the difference between the acceptability of most anaphoric forms is not categorical as the difference between a grammatical utterance and a clearly ungrammatical utterance, but is rather a continuous measure as in the case of object names.
Despite the obvious overlap between issues of anaphoric reference and issues of conceptual representation, theories of conceptual representation seem to have made little if any impact on theories of anaphor distribution and anaphor processing. Instead of appealing to notions of conceptual representation, many of these theories have stipulated strictly linguistic principles on the basis of distributional analysis. For example, a common claim (e.g., Gordon, Grosz, & Gilliom, 1993) is that pronouns are preferred by speakers and expected by listeners when referring to the subject of the previous utterance. This claim is based on the distributional fact that pronouns are the most frequently used referential form when referring to the subject of the previous utterance. However, merely identifying a certain distributional pattern does not explain why this pattern exists in the first place.
The central claim of the present chapter is that an appropriate explanation of the distribution of anaphoric forms must be based on both linguistic principles that can be derived from distributional analysis of anaphoric expressions, and psychological principles of conceptual representation. In other words, the claim is that any explanation that is based exclusively on distributional generalizations is insufficient. The chapter contrasts two theories of anaphor processing. On the one hand, the Informational Load Hypothesis (ILH; Almor, 1996) is a theory of NP anaphor processing that is based on both conceptual and linguistic-pragmatic principles. On the other hand, Centering Theory (Grosz, Joshi, & Weinstein, 1983; Grosz, Joshi, & Weinstein, 1995) represents an attempt to explain anaphor distribution and processing (Gordon, Grosz, & Gilliom, 1993) solely on the basis of distribution-derived generalizations.
It should be stated that the discussion in this chapter focuses primarily on two types of anaphors that are most commonly discussed in the literature-full noun phrases (proper names, like "Fido", or definite descriptions, like "the dog") and non-reflexive unstressed pronouns (like "him"). However, many of the principles and mechanisms described below could be easily extended to explain the use of other kinds of discourse anaphors, and possibly referential expressions in general.
Anaphor processing and the Informational Load Hypothesis (ILH)
Perhaps the most commonly made observation about the distribution of referring expressions is that there seems to be an inverse relation between the relative salience of the referent in the context of the discourse and the amount of information conveyed by the expression used to refer to it-the more salient the referent is, the less likely it is to be referred to by a highly explicit referring expression, such as a definite NP (e.g., Almor, 1996; Ariel, 1990; Chafe, 1976; Gundel et al., 1993; Prince, 1981; Valduvi, 1993) . Indeed, less explicit referring expressions like pronouns and null anaphors are almost exclusively used when the referent is very salient (Ariel, 1990; Gundel et al., 1993) . For example, in the absence of preceding discourse context, a certain dog is likely to be referred to by the relatively explicit expression "the dog", or even by the more explicit expression "the small dog" if there are other dogs that are relevant in that context and that are bigger than that dog. However, if that particular dog happens to be salient by virtue of being the most recently mentioned referent, or even by virtue of having suddenly entered the room with a loud bark, the non-explicit pronoun "it" is the most likely referential form to be used (anaphorically in the first case, and deictically in the second).
This basic observation leads to several important questions that any theory of reference needs to address. First, what factors affect the salience of referents in the discourse? Second, what factors render an expression more or less explicit? And third, why are explicitness and salience inversely related? Although all three questions are important, it is the second and third questions that are of primary interest in the present chapter. (The literature on the first question is extensive and will not be reviewed here except to mention some of the factors that have been shown to affect salience. These factors include discourse topic (Givon, 1976) , informational status (new information vs. given information; Chafe, 1976; Deemter, 1994) , grammatical function , syntactic construction (Almor, 1996; Carpenter & Just, 1977; Cutler & Fodor, 1979) , order of mention , the amount of intervening text since the most recent mention (Sanford & Garrod, 1981) , and relevant world knowledge (Sanford & Garrod, 1981) .)
Although the relation between referent salience and anaphor explicitness is acknowledged by many theories of reference, most theories focus on systematically describing this relation and not on explaining the reasons for its existence in the first place (e.g., Gundel et al., 1993) . A common view (e.g., Gordon et al., 1993; Gundel et al., 1993; Vonk, Hustinx, & Simons, 1992) is that the form of referring expressions serves a communicative function-speakers and writers use specific anaphoric form as cues to aid listeners and readers understanding of the following discourse. For example, Gordon et al. argued that the use of a pronoun to refer to the most salient referent serves as a cue for topic continuity, and Vonk et al. argued that the use of an NP anaphor to refer to the most salient referent signals a topic shift. Unfortunately, this communicative function of referential form, even if true, does not explain why there is an inverse relation between referent salience and anaphor explicitness, nor does it provide any insight into what anaphor explicitness is. In fact, any theory that ascribes the processing of pronouns and NP anaphors to different mechanisms (e.g., Garrod, Freudenthal, & Boyle, 1994) or different levels of representation (e.g., Cloitre & Bever, 1988) cannot provide a satisfactory answer to these questions.
There are several theories, however, which attempt to address the question of the relation between referent salience and anaphor explicitness. For example, Ariel's (1990) accessibility theory is based on the observation that, in general, the more salient (or accessible, in Ariel's terms) the referent is, the less information is contained in the anaphoric expression. To explain the inverse relation between anaphor informativeness and referent accessibility, Ariel, in accordance with Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Sperber & Wilson, 1995) , associates different processing costs with the different forms of reference-definite NP anaphors have a high processing cost because they evoke a more detailed representation whereas pronouns have a smaller processing cost because they evoke a very general representation containing only number and gender features. Ariel argues that establishing reference to a highly accessible referent only requires a low cost referring expression whereas establishing reference to a referent that is not highly accessible requires a sufficiently informative referring expression that may have a higher cost.
In associating the explicitness of a referential expression with a notion of processing cost, Ariel's (1990) accessibility theory represents a significant insight into the nature of the inverse relation between referent salience and reference explicitness. Expanding on Ariel's work, Almor (1996) outlines the Informational Load Hypothesis (ILH), which states more generally that additional processing cost must serve some additional discourse function: Cost is defined in terms of conceptual representation (based on the semantic distance between the representation of the anaphor and the representation of the antecedent) and not just in terms of anaphoric form. Discourse function includes identifying the referent but also adding new information. The intuition behind the notion of processing cost is that the less specific the representation of the anaphor with respect to the representation of the antecedent, the less costly the anaphor is to process. For example, given the antecedent "a dog," the anaphor "the little poodle" would be more costly than the repetitive anaphor "the dog," which in turn would be more costly than the anaphor "the animal," which in turn would be more costly than the pronominal anaphor "it". Also, because cost is defined on the basis of the relation between the semantic representations of the anaphor and the antecedent, the anaphor "the animal" would be more costly when co-referring with the antecedent "the dog" than when co-referring with the antecedent "the little poodle."
An important implication of the ILH is that anaphors are distinguished not only on the basis of their formal category (e.g., pronouns vs. NP anaphors) but also on the basis of their cost, which is defined in terms of conceptual representation, and on the basis of the discourse function they serve. Therefore, according to the ILH, there should be differences in the distribution and processing within the class of NP anaphors just as there are differences in distribution and processing between pronouns and certain NP anaphors. Clearly, anaphoric expressions from different classes tend to differ in their processing cost and functionality-pronouns bear a small computational cost by virtue of their impoverished conceptual representation, while definite NP anaphors accrue a higher computational cost but may have additional functionality in identifying the referent and in adding new information. However, according to the ILH, this difference is not an inherent property of the formal class of these anaphors but rather an outcome of the underlying conceptual representation and principles of pragmatics. According to the ILH, the processing of two distinct NP anaphors can be as different as processing an NP anaphor and a pronoun.
In a series of self-paced reading experiments, Almor (1996) tested the predictions of the ILH by measuring the reading time of NP anaphors under different conditions of discourse function and computational cost. The discourse function of anaphors was manipulated by syntactically changing the focal status of the antecedent-a syntactically unfocused antecedent should, according to the ILH, justifies an anaphor with a higher cost. Syntactic focus was manipulated through the use of it-and wh-clefts. This manipulation allowed a control of the salience (i.e., focal status) of an antecedent without confounding it with the effects of word order and recency of mention. Computational cost was manipulated by changing the semantic distance between the conceptual representation of the anaphor and the conceptual representation of the referent. This was done by using an anaphor that is a category term (e.g., "the bird") with antecedents that differ in their degree of typicality in that category (e.g., "the robin", which is a typical instance and "the ostrich" which is atypical). The assumption underlying this manipulation is that the less detailed the representation of the anaphor is with respect to the representation of the antecedent, the less costly is the anaphor to process. Thus, the anaphor "the bird" would be less costly when the antecedent is "the ostrich" than when the antecedent is "the robin". It should be noted that according to the ILH, reading times do not reflect merely the cost of referring expressions, but rather the relation between their cost and their discourse function.
Several main findings of these experiments support the claims of the ILH. First is the finding that repeated NP anaphors are read slower when their antecedent is focused than when it is not focused. The ILH attributes this repeated NP penalty to the use of an anaphor which has a high cost with no functional justification. Repetitive anaphors do not add new information and thus their high cost (due to evoking a representation that is as detailed as the representation of the antecedent) is only justified when they help identify the antecedent. Because the focused referent is the "default" antecedent, the high cost of a repetitive anaphor is better justified when its antecedent is unfocused.
The second finding is that non-repetitive NP anaphors are read faster when their antecedent is focused than when it is not focused. Indeed, the ILH states that anaphors with low cost, or high cost but that add new information are easier to process when their antecedent is focused. Thus, while non-repetitive anaphors are read faster when their antecedent is focused (Finding 1), repetitive anaphors are read slower when their antecedent is focused (Finding 2).
The third finding is the inverse typicality effect-category NP anaphors with a focused antecedent are read faster if they are more semantically distant from their antecedent. The ILH states that for anaphors with focused antecedents, the less costly they are with respect to that antecedent, the easier they are to process. Cost is related to the difference between the conceptual representation evoked by the anaphor and the conceptual representation of the referent, such that the more general (i.e., less detailed) the representation of the anaphor with respect to the representation of the antecedent, the less costly the anaphor is. Therefore, a category anaphor is less costly when its antecedent is an atypical member of the category than when it is a typical member. Intuitively, using a category anaphor with an atypical antecedent is analogous to using a pronoun, whereas using a category anaphor with a typical antecedent is analogous to using a repeated NP anaphor. This analogy is further supported by the additional (fourth) finding that with category anaphors with unfocused antecedents, a regular typicality effect is observed-the category anaphor is read faster when its antecedent is a typical member of the category than when it is an atypical member. In summary, these findings show that the processing of NP anaphors presents heterogeneity compatible with their cost and function as argued by the ILH.
The ILH and pronouns
The evidence reviewed above shows the ILH to be an adequate account of the processing of NP anaphors. Crucially, some NP anaphors are processed more similarly to pronouns than to other NP anaphors. This leads to the question of whether the ILH can account for the processing of pronouns as well as the processing of NP anaphors. Previous accounts have attributed the processing of pronouns and NP anaphors to different mechanisms. Cloitre & Bever (1988) have argued that pronouns access the conceptual representation of discourse referents, whereas definite NP anaphors access their phonological representation. Sanford & Garrod (1981) have argued that pronouns typically access discourse representations that are stored in a special memory type which they called "explicit focus," whereas definite NP anaphors typically access discourse representations in a different type of memory which they called "implicit focus." Greene, McKoon, & Ratcliff (1992) have argued that definite NP anaphors are processed on-line as they are encountered in text or speech, whereas the interpretation of pronouns may be delayed until the end of the utterance. Gordon et al. (1993) have argued that pronouns mark the coherent continuation of the discourse topic, whereas Vonk et al., (1992) have argued that NP anaphors mark a topic shift.
Most of the evidence for separate mechanisms for processing pronouns and definite NP anaphors is easy to explain by the ILH. Crucially, many of these studies (e.g., Cloitre & Bever, 1988; Gordon et al., 1993; Vonk et al., 1992) relied on evidence obtained with repetitive NP anaphors as the sole basis for their claims. As discussed above, the ILH claims that repetitive NP anaphors are in fact processed quite differently than many other kinds of NP anaphors. Thus, it is likely that many of these previous results represent only a difference between the processing of pronouns and the processing of repetitive NP anaphors and not between the processing of pronouns and the processing of NP anaphors in general.
Other evidence is also compatible with the ILH. As pronouns carry only little semantic information, they would be the preferable mode of reference, according to the ILH, when the referent is the most salient in the discourse. When a particular referent is not the most salient one in the discourse, additional cost is licensed, leading to an increased likelihood of non pronominal reference. Thus, the principles of the ILH can be readily applied to account for the processing and distribution of pronouns as well as NP anaphors.
However, although the ILH can explain why pronouns are preferred when referring to the most salient referent, most other theories of reference processing can also account for this basic fact. To make the ILH an attractive general theory of reference and not only of NP anaphors, it is important to see whether it can explain findings about pronouns that other theories of reference cannot. The next section addresses this issue by reviewing some recent findings about anaphor processing in Alzheimer's Disease. These findings are hard to account for without relying on notions of processing cost and discourse function, the same notions that distinguish the ILH from all other theories of reference.
Reference in Alzheimer's Disease
The speech of patients with Alzheimer's Disease (AD) is often described as "empty" as it contains a high proportion of high frequency words that convey little or no information (Kempler, 1995) . One particular aspect of the empty speech in AD is the excessive use of pronouns. Interestingly, this overuse of pronouns in production is accompanied by a serious pronoun comprehension impairment. In particular, a recent study (Almor, Kempler, Andersen, & MacDonald, 1997) , utilizing a cross modal naming methodology, found that: 1) AD patients are less sensitive than aged-matched healthy control subjects to violations of number and gender agreement between pronouns and their antecedents, as in (mismatching pronoun is capitalized): "The children loved the silly clown at the party. During the performance, the clown threw candy to HIM."
2) AD patients are faster to name an adjective that is part of the representation of the antecedent when reference has been maintained through NP anaphors rather than through pronouns (e.g., the capitalized target is read faster in "The housewife watched the clumsy plumber working under the sink. The housewife showed the plumber where the leak was. The housewife could not believe that the plumber was so CLUMSY." than in "The housewife watched the clumsy plumber working under the sink. She showed him where the leak was. She could not believe that he was so CLUMSY.") In contrast, age-matched normal controls show exactly the opposite pattern-they are faster to name the adjective when reference is maintained through pronouns than through NP anaphors.
Thus, although the production of AD patients is characterized by an abnormally frequent use of pronouns, their ability to comprehend pronouns is significantly compromised and they are better able to access information about the referent when an NP anaphor is used. This dissociation between comprehension and production requires an explanation. The global and patchy nature of the brain atrophy associated with AD (Terry et al., 1991) , as well as the global cognitive impairment in AD, preclude an explanation based on selective and independent deficits to the comprehension and production systems. Rather, the nature of the brain and cognitive impairment in AD suggests that some general factor underlies both the reference production and the reference comprehension impairments. One likely factor is the reduction in activation differences between memory representations in AD. This general memory impairment has two important effects on reference processing in AD. First, it likely compromises the semantic representation of referents. Indeed, AD patients are notorious for making many semantic errors such as superordinate substitution (e.g., saying "animal" instead of "dog") and coordinate-term substitution (e.g., saying "cat" instead of "dog"; Hodges, Salmon, & Butters, 1991) . Second, the general memory impairment likely reduces the relative differences in activation (i.e., salience) between different referents. Again, there is indeed abundant evidence that AD impairs working memory (Waters, Caplan, & Rochon, 1995) .
On the basis of this general memory impairment in AD, the ILH provides the following explanation for the pattern of referential impairment in AD. The task of language production requires the selection of an appropriate referring expression. The ILH characterizes this selection process as a choice of the best combination of cost and function. The AD memory impairment leads to a compromised semantic representation which in general makes for less specific representation. For example, the representation of "dog" might become more similar to the representation of "animal". According to the ILH, this loss of specific information about the referent causes an increase in the cost of all anaphors to this referent. Therefore, a more general and less costly term like a pronoun is likely to be used. For example, although the anaphor "the animal" has only little cost with respect to the antecedent "the dog," it has a higher cost with respect to the antecedent "the animal" and is thus more likely to be replaced with the pronoun "it". Thus, according to the ILH, the overall degraded semantic representation of referents in AD leads to an overall increase in the processing cost of all referring expressions, thus rendering the more general expressions more likely to be produced.
The task of language comprehension on the other hand requires the successful identification of the antecedent. Again, the ILH claims that the ease of processing a referring expression is determined by the relation between its cost and discourse function. Although NP anaphors are normally more costly and indeed may hinder the performance of healthy subjects, they may nevertheless serve a special function for AD comprehenders. For AD comprehenders, repetitive NP anaphors provide significant facilitation in identifying and reactivating the representation of the referent in working memory. Thus, the overall degraded working memory representation in AD leads to an overall decrease in discourse salience, thus enabling costly referring expressions to attain more functionality in AD comprehension by aiding the identification of the antecedent.
The evidence from the Alzheimer's research complements the evidence from young readers, suggesting that the processing of pronominal and NP anaphors complies with principles of cost and function as argued by the ILH. When cost or function changes, as in the case of AD patients, the processing of referential expressions changes accordingly.
Centering Theory
The appeal to processing cost and discourse function is not common to all theories of anaphor processing. In fact, one prominent theory of reference, Centering Theory Grosz et al., 1983; Grosz et al., 1995) , rests on the assumption that NP anaphor processing cannot be explained on the basis of general principles, like cost and function, but rather obeys a set of idiosyncratic co-reference rules.
On the basis of the distribution of anaphoric references in short dialogues, Grosz et al. (1983; construed a set of abstract constraints that apply to referents ordered by salience. Although salience is assumed to have an independent status, it is operationally detected through the use of the first rule of Centering: A pronoun should be used when referring to the most salient referent if any pronoun is to be used at all. Clearly, in contrast to the ILH, Centering is a theory of reference that a) differentiates between anaphors on the basis of their formal class (i.e., NP anaphors vs. pronouns); and b) derives its mechanisms and principles from generalized distributional patterns and not from pragmatics or psychological notions.
Although originally devised to capture generalizations about the distribution of pronouns, Centering has been claimed to provide an adequate model of the actual psychological processing of anaphoric expressions. In particular, Gordon and his collaborators (Gordon, 1993; Gordon & Chan, 1995; Gordon et al., 1993; Gordon & Scearce, 1995) have established a paradigm based on a comparison between pronouns and repeated NP anaphors to support the psychological validity of the first Centering rule. Underlying the work of Gordon and his collaborators is a stricter interpretation of the first rule of Centering, which states that references to the most salient discourse entity should be realized by a pronoun. Although this interpretation was in fact part of the original Centering proposal (Grosz et al., 1983) , the latest version of the theory (Grosz et al., 1995) used the less stringent version mentioned above, namely, that if any referent is referred to via a pronoun then the most salient discourse entity must also be referred to via a pronoun. The psychological prediction Gordon et al. (1993) derived from the stricter interpretation of the first Centering rule is that its violation should accrue some processing cost. Indeed, in a series of self paced reading experiments designed to test this prediction, Gordon et al. found that in each sentence there exists only one referent that, when realized as a repeated NP, leads to a slower sentence reading time than when realized as a pronoun. Because in all their experiments Gordon et al. compared pronouns to repetitive NP anaphors, they dubbed the additional processing time of those anaphors as the "repeated name penalty". Gordon et al. interpret the "repeated name penalty" as supporting the claim that a pronoun is better than an NP anaphor as a form of reference to the most salient referent.
Although the repeated name penalty observed by Gordon et al. (1993) is very similar to the NP anaphor penalty observed in Almor (1996) , the two studies arrive at strikingly different conclusions. In contrast to the claims of Gordon et al., Almor claims that what makes a certain anaphor more or less acceptable in any given context is not its formal class but rather the relation between its processing cost and discourse function. If violating the first Centering rule is the explanation of the repeated name penalty, as Gordon and his collaborators argue, then there should be a more general "definite NP penalty" associated with referring to the most salient entity with a definite NP. In other words, the penalty should not be restricted to repetitive anaphors, but should also accrue for definite NP anaphors in general. However, the findings of the Almor (1996) study clearly show that only repetitive NP anaphors are read slower when their antecedent is focused than when it is not. This suggests that the repeated name penalty observed by Gordon et al. is a consequence of the repetitive nature of the anaphors they used, which renders them unnecessarily costly, and not a consequence of depriving readers of the pronoun cue, as Gordon et al argue.
Concluding comments
Centering Theory (Grosz et al., 1983; Grosz et al., 1995) is established on the premise that anaphor distribution is determined by a set of idiosyncratic constraints, and that these constraints can be described on the basis of distributional analysis alone. Most significantly, these constraints do not relate directly to any psychological mechanisms. Instead, Centering establishes its own terminology that resembles, but is not systematically related to, psychological notions such as activation, attention, and working memory. The motivation for this comes from Grosz et al.'s (1983) observation that there are certain regularities in people's choices of referring expressions that are impossible to describe by pragmatic considerations alone, by syntactic considerations alone, or even by psychological considerations alone (e.g. working memory size and structure). On the basis of this observation, Grosz et al. (1983) argue that there must be a different set of principles, ones that are unique to representing and processing reference, that underlie people's choice of referring expressions. However, this argument holds only if there must be one module that underlies anaphor distribution. Alternatively, one can, in line with the ILH, view anaphor distribution as the outcome of underlying constraints from multiple domains.
The argument of Grosz et al. (1983; for construing a distinct and autonomous "reference resolution module" bears striking resemblance to the claims and assumptions within the field of generative linguistics. Indeed, the principled exclusion of general psychological factors from "the theory of language" is the trademark of generative linguistics. According to Chomsky (1964) , one has to distinguish between the representation of linguistic knowledge-"linguistic competence"-and the factors which affect the use and application of that knowledge in actual behavior-"linguistic performance." By this view, the role of linguistics is to use its theoretical tools to characterize the representation and organization of linguistic competence, while the role of psycholinguistics is to expose the ways in which these linguistics-theoretic representations are actually used by the human mind (Frazier, 1995) . The representations derived by linguistic analysis are based entirely on the distribution of word strings in the language and do not incorporate any constraints imposed by perceptual and cognitive processes that are not directly evident in the distribution. In this view, factors such as the amount of available memory, the cost of computation, and the degree of activation of mental representations, do not affect the core representation of language but only the processing of these representations in actual language use.
Although the assumption that mental representations should be defined on the basis of the distribution of linguistic forms prevails in much of the work on the representation and the processing of syntactic structure, it is clearly problematic for theories of anaphor processing. Counting how many occurrences of each referential form occur in different contexts and stipulating principles to describe this distribution misses many important facts. As is demonstrated by the Almor (1996) study, psychological factors do play an important role in anaphor processing. As these psychological factors change, as in Alzheimer's Disease, the processing of referential expressions changes accordingly. Distributional analysis that is sensitive merely to the form of anaphoric expressions is not likely to provide all the necessary facts. Moreover, gross distributional patterns do not constitute mental representations but rather are the product of mechanisms operating on the basis of these representations by principles of cost and function.
